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How to Get SaaS Customers on LinkedIn: The Brex Lesson

By Dr. Navraj Chohan · Oct 4, 2026 · 14 min read

The early Brex team didn't simply use LinkedIn to find more startup founders. They reportedly looked for a particular kind of founder with a particularly painful problem: foreign founders who could struggle to obtain traditional U.S. corporate credit. The lesson is bigger than LinkedIn. The fastest path to customers may begin by finding the people for whom your problem is unusually difficult to ignore.

Imagine two fishermen standing beside the same lake. The first has an enormous net. He throws it as far as he can, drags it through the water, pulls it back and examines what he caught. Most of what comes up is useless. So he buys a larger net. The second fisherman does something that initially appears less ambitious. Before throwing anything into the water, he spends the morning studying the lake. He watches where the birds gather, where insects land and where the surface breaks. Then he drops a small line into one particular place.

Modern sales technology has made it remarkably easy to become the first fisherman. LinkedIn contains hundreds of millions of professionals, and its search tools allow a founder to filter them by title, company, geography, industry, seniority and countless other characteristics. Add automation software and suddenly a single founder can attempt to contact hundreds or thousands of people. The natural conclusion is that LinkedIn becomes more useful as the number of prospects increases.

But some of the most interesting early distribution stories suggest the opposite. LinkedIn becomes powerful when the list gets smaller.

Brex provides a useful example. Long before it became a multibillion-dollar financial technology company, its founders faced the same question confronting almost every startup: who should use this first? Their answer was not simply "startups." They reportedly concentrated on a much narrower group, including foreign founders building companies in the United States. Those founders could encounter an unusually frustrating problem. They needed corporate financial products, but as newcomers to the United States they might lack the personal credit history that traditional financial institutions expected.

Brex had found something much more valuable than a demographic.

It had found an asymmetry in pain.

The Customer Who Needs You More Than Everyone Else

Suppose you build software that saves a company two hours every month. Almost every company might benefit from it. You can reasonably describe the market as enormous. There are millions of businesses that would prefer to have those two hours back.

There is only one problem: nobody particularly cares.

This is one of the great traps of market sizing. A huge number of people can technically benefit from a product while almost none of them feels enough urgency to buy it. The founder looks at the total addressable market and sees opportunity. The customer looks at the problem and thinks, "I'll deal with it later."

Now imagine that the same software saves a particular group twenty hours every week. Suddenly the economics change, but so does the psychology. The product no longer competes against mild inconvenience. It competes against a problem the customer is actively trying to make disappear.

This is what makes the Brex example interesting. The important insight was not merely that startup founders needed corporate cards or financial services. Plenty of founders did. The more useful observation was that some founders experienced the problem more intensely than others.

Foreign founders could be excellent prospects precisely because the conventional alternative could be more difficult for them.

This suggests a useful question for any SaaS founder preparing to use LinkedIn: who has the worst version of the problem you solve?

Not who could use the product.

Who needs it most?

Why LinkedIn Is Different From an Email Database

At first glance, LinkedIn looks like a gigantic directory. A founder can search for chief marketing officers at SaaS companies with 11 to 50 employees, collect their names and begin outreach. This is useful, but it underestimates what makes LinkedIn unusual.

LinkedIn doesn't merely tell you who people are.

It frequently tells you what is happening to them.

A founder announces that the company just raised a seed round. A sales leader posts that the team is hiring ten account executives. A company announces expansion into Europe. A marketing executive complains that attribution has become difficult. A founder describes how quickly customer support volume is increasing.

These are not simply profile attributes. They are events.

Events matter because buying decisions happen in time. A company with 50 employees might theoretically need your software, but a company that grew from 20 to 50 employees in six months may need it right now. A VP of Sales might fit your ideal customer profile, but a VP of Sales who just announced a hiring spree may be entering the exact situation your product solves.

This is the difference between an ideal customer profile and a buying signal.

The profile tells you whom to watch.

The signal tells you when to speak.

The Mistake of Starting With the Message

Founders often begin LinkedIn outreach by writing a message. They spend hours adjusting the opening sentence, experimenting with connection requests and asking whether the pitch should appear in the first message or the third.

But the Brex story suggests that the more important work happens before anyone writes anything.

If you contact the wrong person, the perfect message is still wrong.

Imagine you have built a SaaS product for companies struggling with SOC 2 compliance. You could search LinkedIn for every CTO at a software company and begin messaging them. Some will need compliance software eventually. Many will not need it today.

Now narrow the list to CTOs at B2B SaaS companies selling into enterprise customers. Narrow it again to companies currently moving upmarket. Narrow it again to founders publicly discussing enterprise deals being delayed by security reviews.

The list becomes dramatically smaller.

The value of each prospect becomes dramatically higher.

At that point, the outreach message does not have to manufacture a problem. The problem already exists.

This is what good targeting does. It makes copywriting less important.

How to Find SaaS Customers on LinkedIn

A useful LinkedIn customer-acquisition strategy therefore begins with a sentence, but not the sentence you send to a prospect. It begins with a sentence describing the customer.

Instead of saying, "Our customers are SaaS companies," say, "Our best customers are seed-to-Series-A B2B SaaS companies moving into enterprise accounts that are beginning to encounter security reviews."

Instead of "We sell to marketing agencies," try, "We sell to agencies with five to twenty employees that manage paid advertising for at least ten clients and still build monthly reports manually."

Instead of "We help ecommerce companies," try, "We help Shopify stores doing enough order volume that customer-service requests have become difficult for one person to manage."

The purpose is to move from a category toward a situation.

Once you have the situation, LinkedIn becomes a research tool. Search for people with the relevant roles. Examine their companies. Look at hiring, funding, headcount growth, recent posts, new customers, job openings and product announcements. You are looking for evidence that the situation you described actually exists.

This is slower than scraping 10,000 profiles.

That is precisely why it can work.

The Strange Economics of a Small Prospect List

Suppose one founder builds a list of 5,000 people and another builds a list of 100. Which founder has the better distribution strategy?

The obvious answer is the first. Five thousand opportunities are better than one hundred.

But imagine that only one percent of the first list genuinely experiences the problem. The founder really has 50 relevant prospects hidden inside 4,950 irrelevant ones. Now imagine that 70 of the 100 people on the second list have the problem.

The smaller list contains more opportunity.

This is why raw outbound volume can be misleading. A sales dashboard tells you how many messages were sent because that number is easy to measure. It cannot easily tell you whether those messages deserved to be sent.

The Brex example points toward the opposite strategy. Begin with the most constrained version of the market. Identify a group that suffers disproportionately from the problem. Find them. Talk to them. Learn what happens.

Only then widen the circle.

This approach does more than improve conversion. It accelerates learning because the founder receives feedback from people who actually understand the problem. If you show accounting software to someone who barely thinks about accounting, their indifference tells you very little. Show it to someone spending ten hours every Friday reconciling transactions, and their reaction becomes much more informative.

Pain improves the quality of customer research.

Why Personalization Usually Isn't Personal

LinkedIn outreach has developed its own peculiar vocabulary. We talk about "personalization" as though inserting a person's first name into a message creates a personal interaction.

It does not.

"Hi Sarah, I saw you're the VP of Marketing at Acme" is technically personalized. It is also information Sarah already knows.

The useful kind of personalization demonstrates why you chose the person. "I saw you're hiring your first lifecycle marketer after expanding from SMB into mid-market accounts" tells Sarah something different. It tells her that the sender has formed a hypothesis about what is happening inside her company.

The distinction is important because good outbound should feel less like advertising and more like diagnosis. The founder has observed something, inferred that it might create a problem and started a conversation to discover whether the inference is correct.

Sometimes it will be wrong.

That is fine.

The goal of early founder-led outreach is not to pretend you already know everything about the market. It is to create enough relevant conversations that you begin to know more.

How to Do LinkedIn Outreach Without Spamming

Spam is usually a targeting failure disguised as a messaging problem.

A message feels intrusive when the recipient cannot understand why they received it. This is why even polite, well-written outreach can feel like spam. If the product has no obvious relationship to the recipient's current situation, the sender has imposed a sales conversation on someone who never had the problem.

Better targeting changes the interaction.

Suppose a founder publicly writes that their sales team is wasting hours manually updating CRM records. The next day they receive a message from someone who built a tool that automates CRM updates. The recipient may still decline. But the message at least makes sense.

The founder didn't simply find a job title.

They found a problem.

This is the standard LinkedIn outreach should aim for. Before sending a message, ask whether the recipient could reasonably understand why you selected them specifically. If the answer is no, the research probably isn't finished.

For early-stage SaaS, this means sending fewer messages than most automation platforms encourage. It means reading profiles, examining companies and paying attention to what people say. It means sometimes deciding not to contact someone who technically fits the ICP because there is no evidence of need.

Efficiency is not sending more messages per hour.

Efficiency is wasting fewer conversations.

LinkedIn Sales Navigator and the Search for Pain

LinkedIn Sales Navigator can make this process considerably easier because it allows founders to filter and organize prospects more precisely. But the tool should not determine the strategy. A sophisticated search interface cannot rescue a vague ideal customer profile.

The most useful filters usually come from understanding the business problem first. Company size may matter because the problem appears after a certain level of complexity. Geography may matter because regulation differs by region. Seniority may matter because only certain people own the problem. Hiring activity may matter because growth creates new operational pain.

The Brex example is powerful because the targeting logic could be expressed without mentioning LinkedIn at all: find startup founders who are disproportionately underserved by traditional financial products.

LinkedIn was simply where those people could be identified.

That is how founders should think about acquisition tools. The tool is not the strategy. The tool allows you to execute a strategy.

If you cannot explain why a particular group should care more than everyone else, adding Sales Navigator will mostly help you contact the wrong people more efficiently.

The Conversation Before the Sale

One of the advantages of founder-led LinkedIn outreach is that the founder can afford to be curious.

A salesperson working against a quota naturally wants to move the prospect through the funnel. The founder at the beginning of a company needs something slightly different. They need to understand why the funnel exists.

This means an early LinkedIn conversation does not always have to begin with a demo request. Ask about the current process. Ask how the person handles the problem. Ask what they have already tried. Ask whether the problem is annoying or expensive. Ask what would have to happen for solving it to become a priority.

These questions produce information that no LinkedIn filter can provide.

A founder may discover that the prospect has the problem but does not care enough to pay. Another prospect may reveal that the real pain occurs one step earlier than the product addresses. Someone else may say that they already solve the problem with a spreadsheet and are perfectly happy with it.

These are not failed sales conversations.

They are market research with names attached.

The Brex Lesson

The most useful interpretation of Brex's early LinkedIn strategy is not "scrape LinkedIn."

It is almost the opposite.

The interesting part happened before the scraping.

The founders had identified a group for whom the existing system could be particularly painful. Foreign founders building U.S. startups could encounter difficulties that founders with established U.S. credit histories might not experience in the same way. That gave Brex a reason to contact one person instead of another.

LinkedIn then became a mechanism for turning that insight into a list.

This order matters.

Problem → painful segment → prospect → conversation.

Many founders reverse it.

Prospect database → message → pitch → hope there is a problem.

The first system starts with demand.

The second starts with access.

Modern software has made access almost free. You can find executives, enrich contact information, generate personalized messages and automate follow-ups at extraordinary scale.

Which means access is no longer the scarce resource.

Knowing who actually cares is.

A Practical LinkedIn Strategy for SaaS Founders

Start by writing down the problem your SaaS solves without mentioning the product. Then ask which group experiences that problem most intensely. Look for circumstances that amplify the pain: company size, growth, regulation, geography, technology, hiring, customer type, workflow complexity or a recent event.

Turn those characteristics into a narrow prospect profile and find 50 people on LinkedIn who match it. Fifty is intentionally small. You should be able to look at every profile and explain why each person belongs on the list.

Then research the companies and remove weak prospects. Look for signals that the problem may be active now. Read recent posts. Examine job openings. Look for funding announcements, product launches, organizational changes and other clues connected to your hypothesis.

When you contact someone, explain the reason for the conversation rather than immediately describing every feature. If possible, connect the message to something observable about their situation. Ask a small question. The objective is not to squeeze an entire sales process into a LinkedIn DM.

Track the responses by segment and signal. Which kinds of companies reply? Which events correlate with interest? Which job titles understand the problem immediately? Which objections repeat? Which prospects eventually become customers?

Then rebuild the list using what the first list taught you.

This is how LinkedIn prospecting becomes a learning loop rather than a messaging campaign.

The Hundred People Worth Finding

The internet has trained founders to think about distribution in increasingly large numbers. Ten thousand email addresses. One hundred thousand impressions. A million followers. Scale has become synonymous with success because digital products can theoretically serve enormous markets.

But the beginning of a company is often a problem of precision rather than scale.

You don't need a million people to care.

You need enough of the right people to care that you can understand why.

This is why the Brex story is useful far beyond financial technology. The lesson is not that every founder should target immigrants, scrape LinkedIn or copy a fintech company's early sales strategy. The lesson is that markets are rarely uniform. Somewhere inside a broad category of potential customers is usually a smaller group experiencing the problem more severely than everyone else.

Find that group.

Then LinkedIn becomes extraordinarily useful because LinkedIn is not merely a place to publish content or send direct messages. It is a map of companies and people. Once you know exactly what you are looking for, the map becomes much more valuable.

The mistake is opening the map before deciding where you want to go.

Frequently Asked Questions About Getting SaaS Customers on LinkedIn

Can you get SaaS customers from LinkedIn?

Yes. LinkedIn can be particularly useful for B2B SaaS because founders can identify prospects by company, role, industry and other professional characteristics. Founder discussions also continue to cite LinkedIn outreach as a source of early B2B customers, although results depend heavily on targeting, offer, price and market. The strongest approach is generally to identify a narrow customer problem before scaling outreach.

How do I find SaaS customers on LinkedIn?

Start with a narrow ideal customer profile and then search for people whose roles and companies match it. Go beyond demographic filters by looking for signals that indicate the problem may be happening now, such as hiring, funding, expansion, new customers, new regulations or public discussion of the problem.

What should I say in a LinkedIn message to a potential SaaS customer?

Explain why you contacted that particular person, connect your observation to a problem relevant to them and ask a small question or suggest a simple next step. Avoid beginning with a long feature list or generic company introduction.

Should SaaS founders use LinkedIn Sales Navigator?

Sales Navigator can be valuable for B2B SaaS prospecting because it provides more precise search and prospect-management capabilities. It becomes substantially more useful after you have defined a specific ICP and know which characteristics or signals make someone a promising prospect.

How many LinkedIn messages should I send?

There is no universal number. For an early-stage founder, starting with a small, carefully researched prospect set can produce more useful information than immediately automating thousands of messages. Measure conversations, qualified opportunities and paying customers rather than optimizing solely for messages sent.

How do you do LinkedIn outreach without spamming?

Contact people only when you have a reasonable hypothesis that the problem is relevant to them. Research the prospect, make the reason for contacting them clear, avoid deceptive personalization and do not repeatedly pressure people who show no interest.

Source

This case study draws on published accounts of how Brex approached early customer acquisition, including research into how B2B software companies acquired their earliest customers. One account highlights Brex's use of its founders' personal network and LinkedIn prospecting, with particular attention paid to foreign founders who could have more difficulty obtaining traditional U.S. credit products.

The exact tactics of a startup's earliest days are often reconstructed from founder interviews and secondary accounts rather than audited acquisition records, so the Brex example should be treated as a case study in targeting strategy rather than a precise prescription for LinkedIn conversion rates.

The broader lesson is supported by contemporary founder discussions in which early-stage SaaS operators continue to describe personalized LinkedIn outreach, direct conversations and narrow prospecting as ways to find initial B2B customers.